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abstract Over the past decades the development of a car has become a com-
plex activity involving skills and resources from a variety of industries and actors, 
and requiring the accomplishment of tight regulatory norms and market needs. 
Technological and market forces have led incumbent firms to radically change 
the organization of their innovative activities, shifting from a closed vertically 
innovation model to a distributed one. The aim of this study is to review the main 
challenges carmakers are currently facing and the organizational and strategic 
solutions adopted to perform innovative and development activities within verti-
cally fragmented networks. The chapter casts light on the organizational and 
strategic challenges of downstream development activities, then it also tries to 
overview the strategic role of up-front research activities, namely the research 
activities leading to patenting. The main changes brought by the distributed in-
novation model on new product development activities are discussed, focusing 
on the principles guiding outsourcing decisions and the governance mechanisms 
carmakers use to manage networks of external suppliers. The study, then, re-
views the role of patenting in the industry as a means for carmakers to appropri-
ate value from innovation in vertically fragmented networks. Finally, it discusses 
the changes on the organization of innovation activities that the emergence of 
the electric car-standard may imply for carmakers’ innovation strategy.
1 Introduction
Over the past decades, the development of a car has become a com-
plex activity requiring skills and resources from a wide variety of actors 
and industries. Due to the enlargement of the car’s technological com-
ponents (e.g. electronics components) and the rise of new technologi-
cal trajectories (e.g. the «electrification» trend), carmakers have been 
increasingly needing to master a wide variety of technological fields in 
order to stay at the forefront of technological developments (Maxton, 
Wormald 2004). Moreover, market pressures and tight competition have 
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pushed carmakers to speed up their product development process while 
constantly reducing costs and improve quality (Clark, Fujimoto 1991). 
In order to respond to such twofold (technological and market) chal-
lenge, carmakers have revolutionized their product development pro-
cess. In the first place, they have changed the new product development 
organization. Starting from the beginning of the 1990s, they implement-
ed solutions such as (1) the heavyweight project manager (Wheelwright, 
Clark 1992), emphasizing the role of the project leader in integrating 
knowledge and development efforts within teams, (2) multi-project man-
agement tools, for reaping the benefit of sharing components across 
projects (Cusumano, Nobeoka, 1992), and (3) the integrated develop-
ment of product families, in order to reap economies of scope and scale 
by leveraging common product platforms (Meyer, Utterback 1993). As a 
consequence, from an organizational point of view, new managerial roles 
diffused such as the product manager, platform and program managers 
(Clark, Fujimoto 1991).
In the second place, carmakers started establishing a large number of 
external ties with suppliers. Such move not only allowed carmakers to 
quickly access specialized knowledge, thus facing technological novelty 
and uncertainty, but also contributed to reduce the development time 
and costs of new product development activities (Clark 1989; Cusumano, 
Takeishi 1991; Nishiguchi 1994). The central role of external sources 
of innovation contributed to complicate integration and coordination 
problems in new product development process. The most common so-
lution to address such problems was the use of guest engineering and 
new product development teams that involved also suppliers’ engineers 
(Nishiguchi 1994). 
On the whole, technological and market pressures have made the 
process of developing a new car an extremely complex organizational 
task. Thousands of different parts, often developed and manufactured by 
suppliers, have to be integrated into a product that must be both highly 
reliable, e.g. complying with strict regulations, and performing, e.g. 
matching sophisticated customers’ expectations. In this respect, market 
segmentation and customers’ preference volatility have made invest-
ments in new product development very risky: time to market reduction, 
quality improvements and cost cutting have become key variables for 
reducing the sunk costs related to launching a product that once on the 
market may not be well accepted by customers.
In light of the rising product development complexity, the aim of this 
chapter is to provide an overview of the current challenges that carmak-
ers face, taking both the carmakers as well as the broader industry level 
(i.e. suppliers’ networks) as units of analysis. The aim is to describe the 
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organizational solutions adopted by carmakers to carry out both upfront 
research as well as new product development activity and to understand 
their link. The chapter, unlike the usual take on innovation processes 
in the automotive industry, not only casts light on the organizational 
and strategic challenges of downstream development activities (i.e. the 
development process of new car models), but also tries to overview the 
strategic role of up-front research activities (i.e. the research activities 
leading to patenting). These ones, with few exceptions (Antonelli, Calde-
rini 2008) have not been investigated in the literature. This leaves a gap 
in our understanding of the contribution of up-front research activity in 
explaining carmakers’ innovative performance.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we highlight the major chal-
lenges carmakers face in adopting a distributed innovation model. Spe-
cifically, as far as new product development activities are concerned, we 
focus on integration and coordination problems with external sources of 
innovation and the related organizational solutions oems adopt in order 
to benefit from division of labour while minimizing the risks of decay in 
technological competences and architectural knowledge. Then we shift 
our focus to the role of upfront research leading to patenting and review 
the role of patenting in the industry as a means to appropriate returns 
from innovation in fragmented vertical networks. Finally, the study re-
views the potential impact on the organization of innovative activities 
that the «electrification» of the car may cause. The chapter concludes 
by drawing the managerial implications emerged from the analysis and 
highlighting avenues for future research. 
2 Organizational challenges
2.1 Division of labour within the industry value chain 
As mentioned in the introduction, the car is a multi-technology prod-
uct, namely an artefact made up of components that embody a number 
of technologies. Components are distinct portions of the product that 
perform specific functions and are linked to each other through a set of 
interfaces defined by the product architecture (Brusoni, Prencipe, Pavitt 
2001). In the past decades, the range of disciplines relevant to the design, 
development and manufacturing of a car has largely expanded in both 
breadth – the number of relevant fields – and depth – their specialization 
and sophistication (Wang, von Tunzelmann 2000). Given the increasing 
expansion of the set of knowledge and resources, carmakers rely on 
specialized suppliers in order to complement their research and develop-
automotive in transition
22 giulia trombini,  francesco zirpoli
ment efforts and to cope with the increasing product and technological 
complexity. The outsourced activities comprise different phases of the 
innovative process, from design to engineering and production tasks. 
Managerial literature outlines that relying on a network of external 
suppliers provides oems with several benefits that, ultimately, positively 
impact the firms’ innovative performance (Clark 1989). Indeed, suppli-
ers’ involvement in the innovation process provides access to special-
ized and tacit knowledge that for oems would be difficult to replicate 
in-house. Further, supplier’s expertise and comparative advantage in 
the performance of specific tasks decreases the costs and time of design 
and engineering phases of the development process. Finally, by relying 
on a network of several suppliers, firms have access to heterogeneous 
and diversified technological competences. 
Despite the outlined benefits, the division of labour along the indus-
try value chain poses important challenges to carmakers. Firstly, firms 
have to govern multiple and concurrent ties in order to access external 
knowledge and skills; oems have to manage complex portfolios of rela-
tions with external suppliers, selecting appropriate governance mecha-
nisms to boost inter-firm collaboration while minimizing partner’s op-
portunistic behaviour. Secondly, they face a key organizational decision: 
which components/capabilities should be outsourced and which should 
be retained internally? In the next sections, we will analyse both issues 
and describe the organizational solutions helping firms to benefit from 
a distributed innovation model while coping with its complexity.
2.2 Coordination and governance mechanisms
Managing a network of external suppliers requires carmakers to iden-
tify the efficient governance mechanism in order to access external 
knowledge and skills while avoiding issues of opportunism, knowledge 
leakage and appropriability. The choice of the governance mechanism 
is key in determining partners’ incentive to cooperate. Under specific 
circumstances, different governance forms might lead to heterogeneous 
performance outcomes in terms of partners’ coordination, knowledge 
sharing and innovation output. As outlined by the broad literature on 
alliances (Colombo 2003; Oxley 1989), contingent on the motives and 
content of the exchange, some organizational forms are more suitable 
than others in easing and coordinating partners’ interaction. 
Transaction costs literature pinpoints that the choice of the govern-
ance structure is dependent on the contractual and appropriability haz-
ards firms face in the technology exchange (Oxley 1997). The higher the 
complexity and specificity of the exchanged product, the more likely that 
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the relationship is governed by a hierarchical mechanism in order for 
partners to align incentives to cooperate and cope with product com-
plexity (Kogut 1988). Hierarchical forms, such as joint ventures, provide 
firms with the opportunity to restrain opportunistic behaviour and hold-
up issues. Similarly, when appropriability concerns threat the exchange, 
transaction costs literature predicts that firms will recur to hierarchical 
governance structures in order to monitor knowledge flows and avoid 
unintended knowledge spillovers and innovation circumvention issues. 
Another stream of research – the competence perspective literature – 
argues that the choice of the governance mechanism is dependent on the 
degree of overlap between the technological competences of the part-
ners involved in the transaction (Colombo 2003; Mowery Oxley, Silver-
man 1996). A high dissimilarity in partners’ technological bases hinders 
the exchange and learning opportunities, leading partners to choose a 
hierarchical governance form based on tight coordination mechanism 
in order to optimize the technology absorption process and hence the 
knowledge transfer.
Traditionally, in the automotive industry, oems manage networks of 
external suppliers through a diversified portfolio of contractual arrange-
ments, ranging from traditional arm’s length market transactions to 
more hierarchical governance mechanisms such as formal alliances 
and joint ventures. Bensaou (1999), in reviewing the type of carmaker-
supplier relationships, proposes four modes of exchange: market ex-
changes, captive buyer tie, strategic partnership and captive supplier 
tie. The former – market exchange – is used for highly standardized 
products based on mature technologies that require little engineering 
efforts and expertise from the supplier. Given the standardization and 
maturity of the underlying technology, these ties require neither idiosyn-
cratic investments on both parties to the transaction nor coordination 
and knowledge sharing mechanisms. 
Unlike market-based exchanges, captive buyer relationships are char-
acterized by an asymmetric commitment of the partners: the carmaker 
is held hostage by the supplier. Suppliers typically control a proprietary 
technology and benefit from a strong bargaining power over the oem 
(Bensaou 1999). These are contingencies where the exchange involves 
complex components that require customization, but do involve stable 
technologies (e.g. bearings, glass products). The carmaker heavily de-
pends on the supplier specialized skills and assets. 
Strategic partnerships are usually associated to the exchange of high-
ly customized and complex components/subsystems, for instance the 
breaking system or the air-conditioning system. Due to the technology 
and capabilities requirements, both the oem and the supplier put highly 
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specific assets into the relationship. On its side, the carmaker has to 
undertake tangible and intangible investments relative to the supplier’s 
component, given the high interdependence between these components 
and the rest of the vehicle. Suppliers, on their side, develop design and 
production skills tailored to the buyer’s requirements. Hence, due to the 
undertaking of co-specialized investments on both sides of the transac-
tion and the need of extensive coordination mechanisms to cope with 
technological complexity, partners recur to strategic partnerships to 
manage the tie.
Finally, captive supplier ties refer to those asymmetric relations where 
the supplier is held «hostage» by the carmaker and commits large spe-
cific investments to hold the customer and stay in the market. The ex-
change involves complex subsystems based on a new technology typi-
cally developed and owned by the supplier but whose commercialization 
depends on the carmaker.
In light of these different outsourcing modes, the choice of govern-
ance structure to manage the supplier relationship greatly influences 
the capability of the carmaker to involve external knowledge sources 
in its innovation activities. A mismatch between the type of relation-
ship and the content of the exchange might produce negative effects 
from outsourcing, hindering the ability of carmakers to benefit from 
an open innovation model. Such «matching» is indeed very complex as 
carmakers often cooperate with the same supplier on a set of multiple 
and concurrent projects, each featuring different level of involvement 
of the supplier in the new product development process of the carmaker 
(Zirpoli, Caputo 2002). In this respect, the matching of the governance 
structure and the type of relationship must be managed at the level of 
the single project rather than at the firms’ one.
2.3 Outsourcing decisions and the scope of the knowledge base
The second key challenge posed by an open innovation model is relat-
ed to carmakers’ decision on which disciplines and components should 
be developed and produced in-house and which ones are to be contract-
ed out to suppliers. In performing innovative activities, oems face two 
divergent objectives. On the one hand, they aim at exploiting flexibility 
and economies of specialization by outsourcing design and engineer-
ing of components/subsystems to suppliers. On the other hand, they 
need to base their competitive advantage on the capability to introduce 
breakthroughs and new product architectures. Indeed, firms need to 
reconcile economies of specialization while remaining integrated in the 
knowledge domain (Brusoni et al. 2001). 
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In the past, management scholars proposed modularity as the guiding 
principle in outsourcing decisions (Sanchez, Mahoney 1996). Through 
the specification of standardized components interfaces, carmakers 
could outsource the design and development of entire subsystems and 
reduce the coordination mechanisms with the suppliers for the devel-
opment activity. Further, through modularity, firms could increase the 
specialization of their knowledge base and focus on the product-archi-
tectural knowledge, since the component-specific knowledge was left 
to the specialized supplier. 
Recent studies, however, pinpoint the limits of modularity and the 
threats it poses to carmakers in effectively relying on external sources 
of knowledge (Macduffie 2012). Many carmakers incurred negative 
effects when implementing design and engineering outsourcing. In 
this respect, Fiat is a leading example. During the 1990s, the heavy 
reliance on external suppliers in the engineering and design phases 
of new product development activities led the firm to a gradual decay 
in technological and component specific skills, which ultimately hurt 
its capability of managing component interdependencies and above 
all product performance. Zirpoli and Becker (2011) pinpoint two main 
reasons for the negative effect of outsourcing activities based on the 
modularity principle. The first one is related to the intrinsic features 
of the car, whose product architecture is characterised by persistent 
integrality. This restrains the degree of «modularization» of the prod-
uct. The overall performance of a car, in fact, is not dependent only 
on the performance of the specific components but also on how these 
different components/subsystems interact with one another. Hence, 
it is risky to outsource activities on the basis of the product architec-
ture, since vehicle-level performance cannot be attributed to particular 
components.
The second reason is related to competence accumulation issues. 
Due to the distributed learning process characterizing the automotive 
industry, the carmaker acts as system integrator: it coordinates the 
work of suppliers and manages the relevant technological and organi-
zational interfaces (Brusoni et al. 2001). However, by heavily outsourc-
ing the design and engineering of specific components and subsystems, 
oems loose knowledge and familiarity with component-specific tech-
nologies. This loss hinders their understanding of potential product 
interdependencies, ultimately weakening their capability to act as sys-
tem integrator. Hence, the key challenge carmakers face in their inno-
vative activity is the following: how to benefit from outsourcing while 
concurrently feeding internal knowledge domains both in component 
and architectural knowledge?
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The achievement of a balance between economies of specialization 
and competence accumulation is non-trivial. However, according to re-
cent studies in innovation management (Brusoni, Prencipe 2006; Zir-
poli 2010), this challenge can be accomplished through the adoption 
of specific solutions in the organization of innovation activities. oems 
need to maintain in-house technological and engineering capabilities in 
order to effectively coordinate the work of suppliers, and this calls for 
organizational solutions that favour the accumulation of competences. 
In this respect, the division of innovative labour between the oem and its 
suppliers should be based on this principle rather than on pure product 
architecture and cost-efficiency principles, traditionally proposed by the 
modularity literature (Sanchez, Mahoney 1996). The division of labour 
should be such that guarantees the system integrator opportunities of 
learning-by-doing in component-specific knowledge as well as capabili-
ties to introduce new product architectures. Organizational solutions 
that favour in-house learning opportunities on key components and sub-
systems allow the oem to experiment on component interdependencies 
and the vehicle overall performance while concurrently benefiting from 
the involvement of suppliers in the innovation process.
3 Strategic challenges
3.1 Beyond economies of scale:  
  the strategic implications of raising complexity
Exploiting scale efficiencies, a traditional driver of competitive advan-
tage in the automotive industry, plays a less relevant role in a world that 
has turned towards a distributed innovation model. In the new business 
ecosystem, there are many evidences showing that the key challenge 
for carmakers will be to handle complexity in new forms. 
First, as manufacturing, design and engineering of cars are not per-
formed any more in vertical integrated companies but in highly frag-
mented vertical networks, flexibility of cost structure at carmakers’ 
has increased, but so has organizational and strategic complexity. As 
a consequence, while the need for standardization within each single 
model design engineering and production is much less pressing nowa-
days, oems must face new threats. In fact, outsourcing has produced 
the consequence of (1) increasing competitive tensions within the value 
chain (with suppliers’ bargaining power growing) and (2) complicating 
integration and coordination among a higher number of actors (car 
makers, first- and second-tier suppliers, research centres, etc.). In such 
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a scenario, strategic success is a consequence of the ability of firms to 
device organizational solutions consistent with their strategy and less 
dependent on traditional strategic levers, such as economies of scale. 
At the moment, only few producers – notably Toyota – have been able 
to take full advantage of a more distributed mode of production in the 
industry with some, like Fiat, forced to back source design and engineer-
ing activities after having experienced the complexity of managing a 
distributed product development process (Becker, Zirpoli 2003; Zirpoli 
2010) or gm and Chrysler forced to bankruptcy.
Secondly, the minimum optimal dimension of plants due to the adop-
tion of flexible manufacturing systems and lower product development 
costs due to the introduction of virtual simulation tools in product de-
velopment has, once again, reduced the strategic role of pure «scale» 
considerations but augmented the level of complexity to be managed. As 
far as manufacturing is concerned, new production technologies have 
eased the joint production in the same plant and with the same tools 
and equipments of different models lowering break-even points. For ex-
ample, thanks to the flexibility of production technology, Fiat and Ford 
produce in the same plant the Fiat Panda, the Fiat 500 and the Ford Ka. 
On the other hand, the complexity in managing operations has grown 
accordingly. As far as product development is concerned, the growing 
use and accuracy of virtual development and simulation tools has been 
a major source of novelty in the overall product development strategy 
of firms. Traditionally, literature has associated with the use of virtual 
development tools (1) the reduction of experimentation costs due to the 
speeding up of the testing phase, (2) the reduction of the number of 
costly physical prototypes and redesign linked to their fast obsolescence, 
and (3) the improvement of design quality via the availability of informa-
tion very early on in the development process (front loading problem 
solving, Thomke 1998). More recently, however, literature has observed 
how virtual tools help engineers to observe phenomena that are much 
less readily observable otherwise enabling almost infinite iterations of 
the same experiment and, importantly, isolating one parameter in each 
run. As compared with physical experimentation, they therefore ap-
proach a «laboratory-type controlled environment». In this way, virtual 
experimentation allows testing hypotheses that are not constrained by 
the logical bounds of the premises one starts from. It thereby enables 
a non-conservative design, which is important in order to achieve dis-
tinctive new designs (Becker, Salvatore, Zirpoli 2005). These features 
provide carmakers with the opportunity for enlarging and differentiating 
their product portfolios without scarifying efficiency. However, also in 
this respect, it is important to note that the sustainability of an aggres-
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sive marketing strategy based on the proliferation of niche models and 
model variants is premised on the sharing of components and platforms 
across these models. Only this measure would contain the industrial 
costs to a sustainable level. To do so, the challenge is leveraging econo-
mies of scope on both competences and components. This is, once again, 
a hard and complex task from an organizational point of view. In order 
to develop models that share components and systems of components 
without sacrificing their differentiation for customers, company must 
introduce several constraints to design, engineering and manufacturing 
activities and manage a tight organizational integration between inter-
nal functions, product development platforms and external suppliers. 
So far, few carmakers have fully succeeded on this pattern (e.g. Toyota 
and Volkswagen), especially due to its ensuing organizational complexity.
Overall, considering the new modes of designing, producing and mar-
keting cars, there is consensus that the key challenge has switched 
from managing product development activities (and manufacturing ef-
ficiency) by leveraging economies of scale, to governing complex value 
chain relationships and integrating new product development efforts. 
3.2 Leveraging patents across firm’s boundaries 
In the previous paragraphs, we examined the organizational solutions 
oems implement in order to access and integrate external knowledge 
into internal innovative activities and the strategic challenges brought 
by the raising organizational complexity of product development. How-
ever, along with the organizational challenge of how to reconcile division 
of labour and competence accumulation, it is to emphasize that firms 
also face a key strategic issue: how to profit from innovation? Due to 
the distributed innovation process and the high competitive pressure 
in the current industry scenario, it is key to identify and analyse the 
mechanisms carmakers have at their disposal in order to appropriate 
the returns from innovation.
Past innovation literature pinpoints several modes through which 
firms may appropriate value from research investments: secrecy, lead 
time, patents, and complementary assets (Cohen, Nelson, Walsh 2000; 
Teece 1986). The effectiveness of these modes is clearly dependent on 
the appropriability regime of the industry – namely a set of environmen-
tal factors that influence an innovator’s ability to capture the profits 
generated by its invention (Teece 1986, p. 287). Relative to this issue, 
past studies highlight that the tighter the appropriability regime, the 
higher the strength of patents, allowing firms to effectively appropriate 
returns from their inventions and to earn monopoly profits. 
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In the automotive industry, major carmakers traditionally implement 
aggressive patent strategies through up-front research, applying for 
patents worldwide and investing large amounts of resources in maintain-
ing and renovating their patent portfolios. This is particularly true for 
the large incumbents of the industry. For instance, Toyota applies 1,000 
patents per year on average. Other large competitors implement similar 
patent strategies – Volkswagen is an example. 
At first, such a recurrence to patenting might indicate that firms use 
them for profiting from innovation: patents protect the profits directly 
accruing from the commercialization of the patented innovation. Despite 
the intense patenting activity of carmakers, a survey investigating the 
mechanisms firms use to profit from innovation shows that, in the indus-
try, patents are rarely employed as appropriation mechanisms (Cohen 
et al. 2000). Firms strongly prefer secrecy, lead time, and the control 
over strategic complementary assets such as manufacturing and com-
mercialization infrastructures. Many patents, in fact, can be invented 
around at modest costs and they are ineffective at protecting process 
innovations, which represent a large share of oems’ innovation outputs. 
Hence, the questions to be posed are the following ones: what is the role 
of patents in the industry? Why do carmakers adopt aggressive patent 
strategies, despite reporting that patents are ineffective in appropriat-
ing returns from innovation? We believe that the strategic reason has to 
be found in the organization of the innovation activity itself. 
Given the distributed innovation process and the fact that the car is 
a complex multi-technology product, it often incorporates several inno-
vations not directly controlled by the carmaker, but rather by external 
suppliers and competitors. In this context of distributed and highly par-
titioned knowledge, building up large patent portfolios might serve oems 
the achievement of three main objectives. First, they serve as isolating 
mechanisms in order to protect the firm’s competitive advantage. Pat-
ents provide firms with an exclusionary right: they can exclude others 
from the development, use and sale of the patented invention. Given the 
costs of applying and maintaining patents, a proprietary patent strategy 
is likely to be pursued for technologies with high «strategic stakes» for 
the carmakers. In order to build effective barriers to imitation, firms 
frequently build overlapping and complementary patents to minimize 
the chances that the technologies are invented around (Somaya 2012). 
In this respect, an example is provided by the patent strategies imple-
mented by Fiat during the past decade. In order to protect key core 
technologies, such as the multi-jet and subsequent multi-air technology, 
Fiat applied for families of patents worldwide and hired legal experts to 
ensure that the patents were legally robust in order to effectively protect 
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core technologies for the firm’s competitive positioning. These patents 
were then carefully maintained over the patent life-period.
Another frequent mechanism through which firms pursue a propri-
etary patent strategy is co-patenting with suppliers – the patented in-
novation is assigned both to the carmaker and the supplier. Since it 
is frequent the case that competing oems share suppliers for specific 
components/technologies, it is key to overcome issues of unintended 
knowledge leakage and threats of invention re-engineering by competi-
tors. By sharing the proprietary rights with the supplier and integrating 
the joint patenting contract with specific clauses (Hagedoorn 2003), the 
carmaker can overcome these risks. It can effectively control the use the 
supplier makes of the technology, for instance monitoring and limiting 
the diffusion of the technology to competitors through licensing.1 
The second function of patents from a carmaker’s standpoint is that 
of a defensive strategy tool. Through patenting, oems aim to acquire 
freedom to operate and to avoid expensive litigation costs and delays in 
product development and launch, by directly controlling several propri-
etary technologies included in the final product. Firms build large pat-
ent portfolios in order to avoid the risk of being held up for instance by 
competitors and to prevent potential patent disputes with competitors. 
Patent infringement – the use or sale of a patented invention without 
the applicant’s permission – in fact is a recurrent event in the industry. 
Finally, large patent portfolios might serve to reinforce the bargaining 
power of the carmaker in the distributed innovation process. By guar-
anteeing patent coverage, for instance on a core technology that other 
firms are using or developing and on which there are sufficient costs and 
risks in working around the firm’s patents, the patent gives the firm the 
bargaining power vis-à-vis users of the technology through the threat of 
patent litigation (Somaya 2012).
In light of the current organization of innovation activities within 
the industry, it emerges the importance for carmakers to strategically 
manage their patent portfolios both for defensive as well as leveraging 
purposes. The ip management issue becomes central in order for firms 
to protect their competitive position (Reitzig 2004). As management 
scholars have outlined, in this context, supporting organizational condi-
tions such as patent knowledge in the top-level management and optimal 
1. Literature on co-assigned patents reports that, in the past, firms considered co-patent-
ing as a second-best solution, since under specific regimes (like in the us), the co-assigned 
patent can be used or licensed by both assignees without approval from the other. However, 
firms over the years have gained experiences with forging additional contracts in order to 
better monitor the use of the invention by the co-assignee (Hagedoorn 2003).
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cross-functional coordination between legal and technical experts (Re-
itzig, Puranam 2009) become key organizational capabilities to enhance 
performance and appropriate returns from innovation.
4 The challenges to innovation processes  
 brought by the «electrification» of the industry 
Recently the potential technological discontinuities brought by the 
new hybrid and electric power-train technologies have been indicated as 
a potential trigger of a relevant change in carmaker strategic approach, 
industry dynamics and new product development. At the moment, as 
a high number of supply and demand factors can potentially influence 
the evolution of the technological trajectory of hybrid and electric vehi-
cles, it is extremely difficult to evaluate the relative importance of each 
factor in isolation as well as its interaction effects (see also Errichiello, 
Zirpoli 2013). 
Similarly, it is not easy to predict the potential changes that the «elec-
trification» of the industry might bring to the organization of innovation 
activities in the automotive industry. So far, the picture that emerges on 
the power train technology of the future, its evolution, firms’ strategies 
and appropriability regimes is characterized by high «structural uncer-
tainty» (Knight 1921). The technology is still in the phase of «variation» 
and technological ferment – with electric power train competing with 
many hybrid technologies and they altogether competing with other 
«green» and perhaps more efficient solutions (eucar 2009). In this situ-
ation, the mechanisms leading to a «selection» of a dominant design 
and the consequent «retention» of a specific value network and commu-
nity organization configuration (Rosenkopf, Tushman 1998) are far from 
being clearly defined. Under the current scenario where a dominant de-
sign has not yet emerged, we would expect firms’ innovation activities 
to be mainly devoted to upfront research activities in order to explore 
and seize (through patents) the benefits of a new standard. In this phase, 
firms are likely to experience a period of exploration in order to experi-
ment with the different technological solutions and gain capabilities 
on a wider set of technological domains in order to effectively react to 
an eventual technological shift towards the «industry electrification». 
However, so far we do not have systematic empirical evidence showing 
that carmakers and suppliers are carrying out such a type of research 
activity and, hence, no accounts of its effects. Moreover, in case of 
emergence of the electric car as a dominant technological paradigm, 
we expect to observe a re-organization of the automotive value chain 
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and a re-assessment of the value distribution along the supply chain. 
The electrification of the industry might indeed favour the entry of new 
players in the industry (e.g. electricity providers, battery suppliers, etc.) 
with important consequences for what concerns the value creation and 
value appropriation strategies of leading carmakers in the organization 
of innovative activities. On the contrary, if the electric car will remain 
confined to a niche-market, no relevant changes in the organization 
of new product development are expected and industry incumbents 
will be in a position to rapidly switch to alternative and less disruptive 
solutions without loosing the knowledge-base they have accumulated 
over the years. 
5 Final remarks
In the past decades, technology and market factors led to a radical 
re-organization of innovative activities within the automotive industry, 
with a shift from a closed-innovation model to a distributed one. The aim 
of this chapter was to identify and discuss the main organizational and 
strategic challenges in innovation activities that industry incumbents 
are currently facing in light of this radical change. 
From an organizational point of view, the analysis pinpoints the cen-
trality for carmakers to effectively manage networks of external sup-
pliers both for what concerns the mechanisms through which govern 
external ties as well as the type of activities to allocate to external part-
ners. On the one side, the choice of the governance mechanisms – from 
arm’s length market transaction to strategic partnerships – appears to 
be key in order for carmakers to access external specialized knowledge 
while avoiding issues of partner’s opportunism, knowledge leakage, and 
appropriability. The analysis casts a light on the importance of selecting 
the governance relationship by taking as primary unit of analysis the 
project-level rather than the partner’s one. Carmakers, in fact, often 
cooperate with the same supplier in a set of different and concurrent 
projects. It is therefore key to choose the partnering mode that at a 
project level guarantees the effective and efficient involvement of the 
supplier in the internal development activity.
Another major challenge brought by a distributed innovation model 
is the scope of the knowledge base carmakers should master. In order 
to effectively act as system integrators, carmakers need to properly bal-
ance economies of specialization with competence accumulation. In this 
business context, division of innovative labour should hinge on where 
system integrators experience learning opportunities both in compo-
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nent-specific knowledge as well as architectural knowledge. The chapter 
highlights that outsourcing decisions should be based on a competence 
accumulation principle rather than on pure product architecture and 
cost-efficiency principles as past modularity literature has proposed.
From a strategic point of view, the chapter reviews the role of econo-
mies of scale within a business environment characterised by a distrib-
uted and highly partitioned knowledge. The study sheds light on the fact 
that, due to a set of different factors – increasing flexibility of carmakers’ 
cost structure, decrease in the minimum optimal dimension of plants, 
etc. – the key strategic challenge has shifted from managing product 
development activities by leveraging economies of scale to governing 
complexity in value chain relationships and integrating new product 
development efforts. 
Secondly, the chapter clarifies the role of up-front research leading 
to patenting and the use of patents in the industry, highlighting the 
strategic function large patent portfolios may play in favouring carmak-
ers to appropriate value in fragmented vertical networks. By providing 
firms with exclusionary rights, patents represent defensive and isolating 
mechanisms to protect core innovations of the technology portfolio as 
well as to protect firms from the risks of being held-up by competitors 
and incurring into long and expensive patent disputes.
The analysis put forward highlights clear avenues for future research. 
First, in light of the likely technological shift the industry may face in 
the next years, future studies should focus on the technological compe-
tences carmakers are currently accumulating through their patenting 
upfront research activity. The analysis would clarify the type and scope 
of technologies carmakers are currently experimenting and may provide 
empirical insights on the technological standard that is likely to emerge 
and the likely incumbents that, under this standard, may dominate the 
market. Moreover, future studies should also attempt to model the dif-
ferent industry scenarios and hence patterns of division of innovative 
labour that may emerge under the different technological standards. 
This would clarify the future organizational and strategic challenges 
carmakers will face in the coming years. 
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